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THE CONSERVATION/FREE TRADE DEBATE
RESURFACES:
The Uncertain Intersection of the 1992 Driftnet
Fisheries Act and GATT
PAUL STANTON KIBEL*

INTRODUCTION

The intersection of domestic environmental legislation and international free trade has emerged as a zone of legal uncertainty.
On one hand, there are national conservation statutes, such as the
Endangered Species Act, l Marine Mammal Protection Act, 2 and
the recent High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act. 3 These
Acts seek to promote global conservation and protection by placing
trade sanctions on nations that fail to maintain certain environmental standards. On the other hand, there are international free trade
agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade4
• Third-year student, WiIIamette University College of Law. B.A., Colgate University, 1989.
1. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-34 (1973).
2. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1361 (1972).
3. High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, 102 P.L. 582, 106 Stat. 4900 (1992)
[hereinafter Driftnet Fisheries Act].
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GAlT].
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and the Canada Free Trade Agreement. S These agreements seek to
promote global economic development by disallowing and restricting the use of trade sanctions. Over time, conservationists and free
trade advocates will synthesize and integrate their international
policy efforts. At present, however, inconsistencies and disparities
exist. This difficult intersection between the two was clearly evidenced in the 1991 dolphin-tuna dispute between Mexico and the
United States.
The dispute began with the United States' decision to ban the
import of Mexican tuna products6 as a result of Mexican violations
of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMP A). 7 The MMPA
requires that trade sanctions be placed on nations who refuse to
adopt fishing practices that minimize the incidental killing of dolphins and other marine mammals. 8 Mexico responded to the ban
by alleging that the MMPA trade sanctions were inconsistent with
the United States free trade obligations under GATT. 9 Mexico and
the United States, both signatories to GATT, submitted the issue to
a GATT special panel. 10 The panel concluded that the MMPA embargo provisions were inconsistent with GAIT requirements and
issued a formal recommendation that the "United States bring the
measures into conformity with its obligation under the General
Agreement." 11
Although this decision was well received in the international
community, it was met with anger and defiance by those involved
in environmental and pro-conservation efforts in the United
5. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, H.R. Rep. No. 216, l00th Cong. 2d
Sess. at 297-541, (1988), reprinted in 27 ILM 281 (1988).
6. The prohibition against the import of Mexican tuna was a result of a order by the
District Court for the Northern District of California, Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher,
746 F.Supp 964 (N.D. Cal 1990), aff'd 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). This case was
brought by a conservation group against the Executive branch for failure to issue statutory
directives mandating a ban on imported fish.
7. "The Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the importation of commercial fish or
products from fish which have been caught with commercial fishing technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United
States standards." 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (Supp. 1991). The MMPA also calls for embargoes on intermediary nations who purchase fish products from nations in violation of the
statute's dolphin-protective requirements. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371(a)(2).
8. Id.
9. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report ofthe GATT Panel (Aug.
16, 1991) reprinted in 30ILM 1594, at 1598.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1623.
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States. 12 Many conservationists believed that acceptance of the
GA'IT panel's findings, and adoption of its recommendations,
would serve to de-claw several crucial pieces of environmental
legislation. 13
The clearest expression of domestic hostility to the GAIT
panel decision, however, is not found in the statements of conservation advocates. Rather, it is found in the legislative response of
the United States Congress. Within one year of the GAIT panel
decision, Congress passed the much publicized 1992 High Seas
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act (Driftnet Fisheries Act).14 The
Driftnet Fisheries Act went well beyond the mere fish and fish
product embargoes set forth in the MMPA; the Act provided for
potential embargoes on all imports, as well as denial of port privileges to offending nations' fishing vessels. IS Thus, notwithstanding
the GA'IT ruling, the United States has demonstrated its determination to use domestic legislation to further global resource and
wildlife conservation.
The legislative response to the GAIT panel decision has
raised several troubling questions. Paramount among these is what
impact do GAIT and the holdings of GAIT panels have on the
validity of domestic environmental legislation? At present, no clear
answer to this question has emerged. The international authority
of GAIT and the domestic authority of numerous conservation
statutes have become submerged in uncertainty. This Comment
will explore the legal relationship between GATT and United
States environmental legislation, employing the 1992 Driftnet Fisheries Act as an analytic focus.
Part I analyzes the 1991 GAIT panel decision, with special
attention given to those GAIT provisions which were found inconsistent with the MMPA. Part II discusses the international and
12. Environmental groups took the initial lead in denouncing the ruling of the 1991
GAIT panel. For further discussion of the conservationist response, see Matthew Hunter
Hurley, The GAIT, u.s. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in
Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUMBIA L. REv. 2098, 2130 (1992) [hereinafter
Hurley], and Thomas J. Schoenbaum, AGORA: Trade and Environment, 86 AM. J. INT'L.
L., 700, 702 (1992) [hereinafter Schoenbaum].
13. "The decision calls into question the validity of numerous United States environmental protections statutes that seek to use trade measures to enforce environmental
goals." David J. Ross, Making GATT Dolphin-Safe: Trade and the Environment, 2 DUKE J.
CoMP. & INT'L L. 345 (1992) [hereinafter Ross].
14. Driftnet Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(1992).
15. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a) (1992).
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domestic response to the panel decision. Part III summarizes the
1992 Driftnet Fisheries Act, focusing on the reasons for its adoption and the trade sanctions it contains. Part IV reveals potential
inconsistencies between the 1991 GAIT panel decision and the
Driftnet Fisheries Act. Part V addresses the likely consequences of
these inconsistencies. Part VI considers strategies for resolving the
conflict between environmentally-based trade embargoes, such as
those required under the Driftnet Fisheries Act, and international
free trade obligations under GAIT.
I.

1991 GATT PANEL DECISION REGARDING EMBARGOES

UNDER THE MMPA
Before discussing the 1991 GATT panel decision, some preliminary comments regarding GAIT may be of use to the reader
who is unfamiliar with international trade law. GAIT was born in
1947 in the economic aftermath of World War II. Its primary purpose was, and is, to encourage global economic development by
limiting the use of tariffs and import restrictions. 16 The term
"GAIT" refers to both an agreement and an ongoing organization.
The agreement is the initial 1947 document. 17 The ongoing organization is the administrative body that sits in Geneva, Switzerland.
The purpose of the organization is to give effect to the terms and
requirements of the agreement. One way that the organization
achieves this end is by providing dispute resolution panels in which
signatory parties can reconcile conflicting interpretations of the
agreement's provisions. 18
Mexico and the United States submitted their conflict, i.e.,
whether GAIT provisions and MMPA trade sanctions are compatable, to a GATT dispute resolution panel. In reaching its conclusion that the MMPA trade sanctions and GAIT are
inconsistent, the panel pointed to four primary GATT provisions;
Article 111(4), Article XI(l), Article XX(b), and Article XX(g).19
16. For extensive discussion of the history of GAIT, see Mark T. Hooley, Resolving
Conflicts Between the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Domestic Environmental
Laws, 18 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REv. 483, 485 [hereinafter Hooley)
17. GAIT supra note 4.
18. GAIT, supra note 4, Article XXIII. This GAIT provision does not specifically
provide for dispute resolution panels, but does provide that GAIT "shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the
contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as
appropriate."
19. See GAIT Mexican Tuna Panel, supra note 9, at 1623.
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Article 111(4) states that a GATT contracting nation may employ domestic regulations affecting the imported products of other
contracting nations, so long as these regulations do not discriminate between foreign and domestic products. 20 Article XI(1) provides that subject to certain limited exceptions, a GAIT
contracting nation shall not impose quantitative import prohibitions or restrictions on the product of another GAIT contracting
nation. 21 Article XX lists the exceptions which justify a deviation
from the general free trade requirements set forth in Article XI.
Among these exceptions are the trade restrictions "necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life and health," under Article
XX(b)22 and those "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, under Article XX(g). 23
Mexico contended that the MMPA embargo violated the general free trade requirements under Article XI(1).24 The United
States responded to this contention with a two-fold argument.
First, the United States asserted that the MMPA sanctions were
not trade restrictions, but were "laws, regulations, and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of yellowfin tuna harvested [via
dolphin-injuring fishing practices]."25 Because certain domestic
and internal measures are permitted under Article III, the United
States maintained that MMPA provisions did not implicate the foreign trade-related terms of Article XI(1).26 Second, the United
States argued that even if the MMPA embargo was found to violate
Article XI(l), such measures were justified under the conservationrelated exceptions under Article XX(b) and Article XX(g).27 The
20. GAIT, supra note 4, Article 111(4). The section provides, in relevant part, that
"internal quantitative control" shall be allowed so long as tbese domestic measures are not
"modified to tbe detriment of imports."
21. GAIT, supra note 4, Article XI(I). This section provides, in relevant part: "No
prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting parties on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined
for tbe territory of any other contracting party."
22. GAIT, supra note 4, Article XX(b).
23. GAIT, supra note 4, Article XX(g).
24. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the GAIT Panel
(Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted in 30lLM 1594, 1601.
25. ld. at 1602.
26. ld. at 1603. In support of this interpretation, the United States emphasized that
MMPA regulations were enforced at the time or point of importation.
27. Id. at 1605.
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GAIT dispute resolution panel rejected both of the United States'
arguments. 28
The first argument presented by the United States failed because the panel determined that the MMPA embargo applied to
certain production methods (fishing practices), rather than certain
products. 29 Because Article III(4) was limited to internal regulations relating to products, rather than the particular manner in
which products were produced, the panel concluded that the provision was inapplicable. The second United States argument was rejected on the grounds that Article XX's conservation exceptions
were applicable only to resources located within the enforcing nation's jurisdiction. 30 Because the MMPA trade sanctions were
targeted at resources located outside United States territory,
namely dolphins in international waters, the panel held that Article
XX exceptions would not provide a means of reconciling the
MMPA embargo with GAIT.3l
In reaching this outcome, the panel clarified that its "task was
limited to the examination of this matter in light of the relevant
GAIT provisions, and therefore did not call for a finding on the
appropriateness of the· United States and Mexico's conservation
policies as such. '>32 The panel concluded by issuing a recommendation that the United States amend or modify the MMP A so that it
conformed with GAIT's free trade obligations. 33
II.

REsPONSES TO THE 1991 GAIT PANEL DECISION

The GAIT dispute resolution panel procedures do not provide for formal intervention or amicus participation by third parties. 34 Despite the lack of formal intervention mechanisms,
however, GATT has allowed interested third parties to make informal "submissions". Although these submissions cannot be textu28. [d. at 1623.
29. [d. at 1617. The panel concluded that regulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the taking of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product.
30. Id. at 1620. The panel reasoned that if Article XX exceptions were given the
broad interpretation advocated by the United States, each contracting nation could unilaterally determine the environmental and health protections policies of other contracting
nations. Such an interpretation would severely undermine the agreement's basic free trade
guarantees.
.
31. Id.
32. [d. at 1623
33. [d..
34. See GAIT, supra note 4, Article XXIII.

1993]

CONSERVATIONIFREE TRADE DEBATE

59

ally relied upon by dispute panels, they provide a means for other
GATT members to voice opinions on a given controversy. In the
1991 dispute between Mexico and the United States, 12 nations, as
well as the European Economic Community, offered such submissions. 3s Each of these submissions contended that the MMPA
trade measures violated GATT free trade requirements. 36 Moreover, it should be noted that the list of countries which made these
submissions was not limited to developing nations, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Senegal. 37 It also included such economically advanced nations as Australia, Canada, and Japan. 38
Several factors explain the widespread international support
for the Mexican position and the GAIT panel's subsequent ruling.
For developing nations, trade sanctions such as those under the
MMP A are widely perceived as obstacles to second and third world
economic development. 39 This perception, although contested by
many, has some economic basis in reality. Notwithstanding the
MMP A's conservationalist intent, requiring less afiiuent nations to
adhere to the environmental standards of more afiiuent nations
does prevent the former from allocating funds into other areas of
their respective economies. 40 The environmentalist contention that
such an allocation may be in the developing nation's best long-term
interests, though probably correct, does not provide a persuasive
response to this complaint. Regardless of any potential beneficial
effects, the perception of United States economic interference
remains.
The welcome reception of the rulings by the developed nations, such as Canada and Japan, can be attributed largely to the
MMPA's sanctions against intermediary as well as directly viola35. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna. Report of the GATT Panel
(Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted in 30 ILM 1594, 1610-15.
36. Id..
37. Ill. at 1613, 1614.
38. Id. at 1610-14.
39. !d. at 1613-14. "Indonesia noted the economic importance of its tuna trad~ with
the United States," and complained that the MMPA trade sanctions were being used as a
means to shield United States tuna producers from import competition.' Id. Senegal noted
that the MMPA "embargo had caused Mexico to invade Senegal's traditional markets,"
and that this resulted in a severe fall in Senegal's tuna export revenue. Id.
40. See Hurley, supra note 12, at 2140. "The United States unilateral trade bans undermine the principle [free trade] by imposing standards upon other countries that reflect
the cost-benefit analysis of conditions and values in America. Because no negotiations have
taken place between the U.S. and the regulated country, no consideration is given to the
particular circumstances of that country."
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tive nations. 41 The MMPA requires that embargoes be enforced
against not only those countries whose fishing practices fail to conform with U.S. standards but, also against those nations who
purchase tuna from these non-conforming nations. 42 In extending
the sanctions to these intermediary parties, many developed nations
believed that the United States went considerably beyond what
GATT alloWS. 43 The sanctions against intermediary nations have
the intended effect of coercing non-violative third parties into
adopting the same embargo policy as the United States. While
many developed nations were willing to permit the United States to
adopt legislation that potentially conflicted with GAIT requirements, these nations took issue with trade sanctions which encouraged them to do the same. 44
In sharp contrast to the international community's welcome
reception, the United States greeted the panel decision with anger
and dismay. This hostility was evidenced not only by the statements of conservationists45 but by the political maneuvering of the
Legislative and Executive branches.
Most members of Congress responded to the panel decision by
pointing the finger at GATT and the inadequacies of its dispute
resolution processes.46 Senator, then Representative, Barbara
Boxer (D- CA) sent a letter signed by sixty-two of her House colleagues demanding that GATT panel procedures be reformed to
allow for consideration of environmental protection measures. 47
Henry Waxman, chairperson of the House Subcommittee on
41. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371 (a) (2).
42. Id.
43. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the GATT Panel
(Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted in 30 ILM 1594, 1612. The opposition to the intermediary nation sanctions was set forth in the Canadian, Japanese, and EEe submissions. All three
maintained that the application of such third party embargoes was inconsistent with
GATT, and should therefore be disallowed.
44. Id. at 1612. The EEC took great pains to explain that its position in the present
dispute should in no way be construed as an effort to hinder international dolphin conservation efforts. In support of this, the EEe pointed to the anti-driftnet measures that it had
recently adopted. The EEe's objection to the MMPA style sanctions, however, was their
tendency to impose national-based solutions on the rest of the international community.
45. See Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade; No Country Can Protect Its
Own Smidgen 0/ Air or Ocean, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21. In this article, Mathews discusses the environmental impact of the panel ruling and the potential threat of
invalidation it poses to other domestic conservation laws.
46. Members 0/ Congress Protest Recent GATT Ruling on u.s. Embargo 0/ Mexican
Tuna, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1399 (Sept. 25, 1991).
47. Id.
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Health and the Environment, called a special hearing to consider
the potential implications of the ruling. 48 At this hearing, Waxman
called upon the Bush Administration and the United States Trade
Representative to "change the GAIT law to protect our health and
environmental protective statutes."49 Moreover, Waxman also expressed doubt as to whether the Bush Administration had zealously
and competently argued the United States' position. 50 Waxman's
concern was warranted given Bush's lack of enthusiasm for global
environmental protection.
On the diplomatic front, the Executive Branch, also, took
steps to quietly diffuse the potential consequences of the GATT
panel decision. Under the provisions of GATT, Mexico could have
used the ruling to request trade sanctions and fines against the
United States. 51 Wishing to avoid such a scenario and with the
prospects of a completed NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement) close at hand, the United States sent a diplomatic envoy to Mexico. As a result of these negotiations, Mexico's President Salinas agreed not to pursue the matter further, and the Bush
Administration promised to push for a means to exempt Mexico
from the impending tuna embargo. 52 However, this exemption was
not forthcoming. Congress did not amend or modify the MMP A.
In January of 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the
Secretary of the Treasury to institute the MMPA mandated embargo on Mexican tuna. 53 The Bush Administration sought to have
the court ruling stayed but was unsuccessful. 54
Therefore, despite the recommendations of the GATT panel
and the international community's widespread endorsement of the
ruling, all three branches of the United States have yet to incorporate its findings. Members of Congress called for changes in
GATT. The Executive convinced Mexico not to pursue the issue
48. GAIT: Implications on Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 102d.
Cong. lst Sess. (Sept. 27, 1991) [hereinafter House Hearing]. The subcommittee heard
testimony from Joshua Bolten, Counsel for the United States Trade Representative, as well
as conservationists including Ralph Nader.
49. Id. at 41.
50. Id. at 40.
51. See GAIT, supra note 4, Article VI.
52. See, e.g., Hurley, supra note 12, at 2131; Ross, supra note 13, at 353.
53. See Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, (N.D. Cal. 1990),
aff'd 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
54. Appeals Court Lets Tuna Embargo Stand, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at A2.
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further. The Federal Judiciary has issued an order which evidences
that the MMPA and its conservation based trade sanctions still are
valid domestic law.

III.

1992

HIGH SEAS DRIFTNET FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT

ACT

The 1992 Driftnet Fisheries Act was approved, in its predecessor bill form, by the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries. This approval immediately followed the House Hearing
to determine the effect of the GATT ruling on domestic environmental legislation. 55 The bill became law on November 2, 1992. 56
The Act intended to give effect and provide enforcement teeth
to United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 44/225, 45/197,
and 46/215. 57 These international resolutions called for a worldwide moratorium on all high seas driftnet fishing by December 31,
1992. 58 As with the domestic MMPA, the United Nations ban on
pelagic driftnets was adopted to prevent the incidental killing of
dolphins and other non-target marine mammals and birds. 59
The Driftnet Fisheries Act requires the Secretary of Commerce to identify and publish a list of nations whose nationals or
vessels conduct large-scale driftnet fishing in the international high
seas. 6O Once a nation is placed on this list, there are three consequences that follow. The first two consequences are mandatory,
the third is discretionary. First, the Act requires that the Secretary
of the Treasury deny all port privileges to any large-scale driftnet
fishing vessel that is registered under the laws of a listed nation. 61
Second, the President is required to direct the Secretary of the
Treasury to prohibit the importation of all fish, fish products and
sport fishing equipment from such a nation. 62 Third, if it is deter55. See H.R. 2152, \o2d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). A companion bill was introduced in
the Senate. S. 884, \o2d. Cong., 1st 50S. (1991).
56. Driftnct Fisheries Act, ~uprQ notc 3.
57. Drifnte Fisherio Act, suprQ nOle 3, § 2 (a)(4) and Sec. 2(b)(I), These sections of
the Driflnet Fisheries Act set forth the findings and policies relating to the law's adoption.
58. See United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on Large Scale Pelagic
Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World Oceans and
Seas, 44/225 December 22, 1989, reprinted in 29 ILM 1555 (\990), 45/197 (1990), and
UNGOR 46/215 December 20, 1991, reprinted in 31 ILM 241 (1992).
59. See Driftnet Fisheries Act, supra note 3.
60. Driftnet Fisheries Act, supra note 3, Sec. 101 (a)(1).
61. Id., § 101 (a)(2).
62. Id.. § 101 (b)(3).
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mined by the Secretary of Commerce that these mandatory sanctions are insufficient to cause such nations to tenninate the use of
pelagic driftnets, the Secretary may impose restrictions on "any
products from the offending country for any duration."63
The sanctions set forth under the Driftnet Fisheries Act go
considerably beyond the measures called for in the earlier MMPA.
Mandatory imperatives have replaced discretionary possibilities,64
and the range of potentially prohibited products has been significantly broadened. 65 The sanctions adopted in the act clearly suggest that conformity and consistency with GATT were not the
order of the day. If anything, the timing and boldness of the
Driftnet Fisheries Act indicate a congressional willingness to
openly disregard the findings and recommendations of the 1991
GATT panel ruling.
IV.

INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE 1991 GATT PANEL
DECISION AND EMBARGO PROVISIONS OF THE 1992
DRIFTNET FISHERIES ACT

In considering inconsistencies between the 1991 GATT panel
decision and the trade sanctions called for in the 1992 Driftnet
Fisheries Act, it is important to understand that the term "inconsistent" is not being used here in the traditional legal sense. Traditional legal analysis could potentially reconcile domestic
environmental and free trade requirements through the use of jurisprudential tools and creative construction. Such creative construction would remove the inconsistencies and thus remove the textual
conflict. If this were the issue at hand, there are ample jurisprudential tools to allow for such construction, conclusion, and consistency. Consider the following three examples.
First, it is not altogether clear what domestic validity GATT
retains because it never has been given formal advice and consent
by Congress. 66 Thus, one could contend that because GATT is not
63. Id" § 101 (b)(4)(a).
64. The MMPA permitted some discretion in terms of when identification and sanc·
tions were required. This discretion was given judicial recognition in the case of Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 418 U.S. 221 (1986). The Driftnet Fisheries Act has
sought to replace this discretion through the use of more explicit mandatory language. For
examples of such language. see § 101(a)(2) and § 101(b)(3) of the Act.
65. Supra note 60.
66. Without the formal advice and consent of Congress the domestic validity of inter·
national agreements/treaties is questionable. For detailed consideration of the domestic
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valid domestic law, the Driftnet Fisheries Act does not violate any
international treaty obligations. Second, it has been held that Congress may enact subsequent legislation that supersedes a prior international obligation. 67 Thus, one could contend that the Driftnet
Fisheries Act invalidates the inconsistent obligations under GATT.
Third, there is no principle of stare decisis in GATT.68 Thus, one
could contend that the ruling of the 1991 GATT panel has no direct bearing on any detennination relating to the Driftnet Fisheries
Act.
While such arguments provide a clever means of achieving formal and theoretical consistency, they fail to resolve any of the practical and political issues at hand. These arguments fail because the
international community cares not one whit whether the canons of
our domestic jurisprudence, such as separation of powers or last in
time, provide valid justification for refusing to abide by the GATT
rulings. The only issue that concerns the international community
is whether the United States is violating the terms of an international agreement or disregarding the findings of an international
dispute panel. Likewise, the absence of stare decisis in the GATT
ruling is equally irrelevant in the international context. In the international Community, the GATT panel's findings were viewed
not merely as a specific determination but as a general statement
about the use of certain trade sanctions. 69 As Joshua Bolten, Counsel for the United States Trade Representative, stated during the
House hearing following the 1991 GATT decision, "We do have a
choice. We can ignore our ·international obligations, but we do so,
I think, at great cost to some very other important interests. "70
validity of GA'IT, see Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 479 (1990).
67. See Hurley, supra note 12, at 2136. "Federal laws passed subsequent to U.S. ratifications of the GATI, however, are not invalid if they conflict with obligations under the
agreement because it has long been established that Congress may enact a law that supersedes a prior treaty."
68. House Hearing, supra note 48, at 29. At this hearing, U.S. Trade Representative
Counsel Joshua Bolten explained, "The GAIT dispute settlement system is one which is
different from our own court system and similar to international systems in which individual rulings are taken up on individual facts .... There is no principle in GATI of stare
decisis where precedent is formed."
69. EC. Others Pressure u.s., Mexico to Accept GATT Yel/ow./in Tuna Report, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA), Mar 19, 1992.
70. Supra note 48, at 41. Comment was offered in response to Rep. Waxman's charge
that Bush and U.S. Trade Representative had failed to adequately defend the MMPA
consistency with GATI. Waxman expressed doubt about the White House's true objectives, and its expectation that Congress would now fall in line and amend. the law. Given
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The present discussion of inconsistencies is directed, therefore,
more to perceptions of inconsistency within the international community. The 1991 GAIT panel held that the MMPA was incompatible with GAIT for two primary reasons. First, it sought to
regulate not the importation of certain products but the use of certain undesirable, environmentally destructive production methods. 71 While such aims may be laudable, the panel held that they
are not permitted under Article III of GATT.72 Second, it sought
to provide for the conservation of resources located outside the jurisdiction of the United States. 73 Once again, despite the wisdom in
conserving and protecting global resources, the panel determined
that such measures are not permissible under GATT.74 These two
holdings point a boney and condemning finger at the conservationbased trade sanctions set forth in the Driftnet Fisheries Act.
It is this boney and condemning finger that best expresses the
type of inconsistency that arises between the Driftnet Fisheries Act
and the terms of GATT. The Act may be viewed by other nations
as another example of the United States seeking to achieve global
environmental goals through the use of unilateral action. Moreover, in light of the 1991 panel decision, the passage of the Act
might provide a signal as to how seriously the United States views
its obligations under GAIT and the authority of GAIT. Such a
signal may have the unforeseen effect of undermining the international free trade policy that the United States has worked to
construct.
V.

PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INCONSISTENCY·
BETWEEN 1991 GATT PANEL DECISION AND 1992
DRIFTNET FISHERIES ACT

Although the passage of the Driftnet Fisheries Act, for the
reasons discussed above, will be viewed negatively by much of the
international community, it seems unlikely that the Act's validity
will be directly challenged. This is not because the world community now has decided that the United States is free unilaterally to
Bush's opposition to the MMPA style conservation-based sanctions, there were good reasons for Waxman's skepticism and concern.
71. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the GAIT Panel
(Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted in 30 ILM 1594, 1598.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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dictate international conservation policy or because the findings of
the 1992 panel have been reassessed. Rather, a direct challenge of
the Driftnet Fisheries Act seems unlikely because of the international consensus that pelagic driftnetting should be prohibited.
This consensus was expressed most clearly in United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 44/225, 44/197, and 46/215. 75 These
international resolutions called for a worldwide moratorium on all
high seas driftnet fishing by December 31, 1992. Moreover, Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan, the three nations who had most actively
employed the driftnet fishing technique, have recently announced
their intention to discontinue the practice. 76 The Driftnet Fisheries
Act can, and in all probability will, be seen as a means of encouraging global compliance with these resolutions and announcements. 77
The international circumstances surrounding the Driftnet
Fisheries Act are, therefore, quite different than those of the
MMP A. While there may have been a general consensus that nations should not plunder the resources of the high seas, this consensus was too vague and aspirational to justify the specific
requirements set forth in the MMPA. The domestic standards of
the MMPA were thus sailing one boat ahead of the developing international consensus. The Driftnet Fisheries Act, however, appears to be sailing perfectly even with the global position. For this
reason, it seems unlikely that a challenge, such as the one brought
by Mexico in 1991, will be brought before GATT.78 Moreover,
even if such a challenge were brought, it would certainly fail to
provoke the same international response. 79
The practical consequence of the inconsistency between
GATT and the Driftnet Fisheries Act is likely, therefore, to be nil.
The global consensus on the issue, and the passage of accompanying UN resolutions, will have the effect of discouraging any formal
challenge. The Driftnet Fisheries Act, the UN Resolutions, the
GATT free trade provisions, and the 1991 GAIT panel ruling will
all survive as valid domestic and international law. Despite the
75. See UN General Resolution, supra note 58.
76. See UN General Resolution, supra note 58. In addition to being signatories to. the
UNGA Resolution these nations have made announcements in regards to their intent to
discontinue pelagic driftnetting.
77. Telephone Interveiw with Gerry Leap, conservation lobbyist for Greenpeace International in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 1, 1993).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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lack of any discernible consequences, the inconsistencies and disparities remain.
VI.

STRATEGIES FOR REsOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN
DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTALLy-BASED TRADE
EMBARGOES AND INTERNATIONAL FREE
TRADE OBLIGATIONS

While the international circumstances surrounding the passage of the Driftnet Fisheries Act suggest that a repeat of the 1991
Mexico-Tuna dispute will not be forthcoming, the conflict between
domestic environmental legislation and international free trade obligations undoubtedly will resurface. In seeking a means to resolve
such conflicts, the United States is presented with three primary
alternatives. These alternatives are not mutually exclusive and may
be used in conjunction with one another. For purposes of analysis,
however, they are considered best independently.
First, the United States can modify its own environmental
laws so that they conform to the GATT standards of international
trade. This was the approach advocated by the Bush Administration and the U.S. Trade Representative. so So far, however, this
strategy has yet to be incorporated into any federal legislation or
amendments. The lack of enthusiasm for this first alternative is
understandable from both a conservationist and an economic perspective. The problem with this internal modification strategy is
that it tends to reduce domestic environmental laws to the lowest
common international denominator. 81 This downward leveling occurs because the only environmental standards accepted by the entire international community are those standards that are
acceptable to less-developed, less conservation-minded nations. S2
Amending domestic conservation legislation, such as the MMP A,
could have, therefore, the double-negative effect of furthering the
degradation of the global environment while simultaneously placing American producers in an economically disadvantageous
position. 83
80. See Latty B. Stammer, White House Urges End to Ban on Mexican Tuna, L.A.
Times, March 5, 1992, at A3. This article discusses Bush Administration's dislike of unilateral global conservation measures, such as those required under the MMPA.
81. See Hooley, supra note 16, at 491. "[T]he country with the least environmental
protection enjoys an advantage in international trade."
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Second, the United States can push for changes in GATT and
the international trade structure so that proper consideration is
given to environmental concerns. This strategy appears to provide
the best prospect for a lasting and comprehensive solution, and
plans already are underway to initiate such reform. Senator Max
Baucus has proposed that GATT supplement its primary agreement with a GATT Environmental Code. 84. The problem with
such a proposal, however, lies in the likelihood and time-frame of
its adoption. GATT is not known for its ability to respond quickly
or at all, a tendency that has led some to refer to the organization
as the "General Agreement to Talk and Talk. "8S Moreover, a recent GATT study, entitled "Trade and the Environment," concluded that it is environmental treaties and domestic legislation
that are in need of reform, not GATT.86 Such outward-looking
conclusions indicate GATI's unwillingness to respond to and incorporate environmental considerations. Thus, while reforms, such
as the one put forth by Senator Baucus, make good sense, it remains to be seen if and when such reforms will be adopted. While
this waiting occurs, the environmental degradation and destructive
resource exploitation continues.
The third alternative can best be described as a non-alternative. This strategy employs the rather crude technique of simply
disregarding the authority of GATI panel rulings. At present, this
seems to be the primary chosen response of the United States. The
MMPA embargo provisions remain in place, and the Driftnet Fisheries Act has adopted the very sanctions that were disallowed by
the 1991 panel decision. This solution, given the political dynamics
of the driftnet issue, will not blossom into the flower of incoherence
that its logic suggests. Therefore, it will serve the short-term goal
of preserving the validity of domestic environmental legislation.
84. 137 CONGo REC. 13, 169 (Daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
The Baucus plan called for an GATT Environmental Code that would enjoy a legal status
parallel to that of the GATT Subsidies Code. This new code would allow each country to
set its own environmental standards, with countervailing import duties permissible under
certain limited conditions.
85. See David Wirth, Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development: A Primer, 15
HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. ReV. 535, 55g (1992). Comment was made not in reference
to the adoption of the Baucus Environmental Code, but rather in reference to drawn-out,
long-winded negotiations regarding in the Uruguay Round. The description, however,
seems equally applicable in the present context.
86. "Trade and the Environment" (GATT, 1992). For an excellent analysis of the
inadequacies of this report, see Hamilton Southworth, "GATT and the Environment", 32
VIRG. J. INT'L. L. 997 (1992)
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However, this third alternative may have some dangerous longterm effects. Foremost among these effects is the weakening of the
validity and respect for international agreements and international
law.
Because any permanent solution to worldwide environmental
degradation will require the cooperation of nations and an accompanying respect for international agreements, this long-term effect
is particularly dangerous. If the United States maintains, through
its actions, that it has no obligation to abide by GATT rulings, than
why should other nations feel obliged to abide by their international commitments? The United States approach sets a precedent
that may injure not only free trade but the conservationist agenda
set forth at last year's United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development in Rio De Janeiro. In short, those environmentalists who advocate an open disregard of the 1991 GATT panel
ruling might be losing the war for the sake of a single battle. The
disregard of free trade agreements today could pave the way for the
disregard of wildlife and deforestation agreements tomorrow. Such
a result would be ironic, given the objectives of those who have
supported this third alternative, but it would not be unforeseeable.
CONCLUSION

The recent passage of the 1992 Driftnet Fisheries Act gives
further evidence of the tense and uncertain relationship that exists
between domestic environmental legislation and GATT free trade
obligations. Although the issue often has been framed as a struggle
between natural conservation and economic development,87 such a
characterization fails to adequately reveal many of the essential dynamics of the problem. It is not simply a question of striking a
balance between conservation and trade; it is a question of who
will, or who should, do this striking.
Through the adoption of the Driftnet Fisheries Act, the
United States has declared that it will continue to promote global
conservation through statutorily-mandated trade sanctions. The
Act thus supports the position that nations are free to unilaterally
seek international environmental protection. Through its ruling in
87. See Schoenbaum, supra note 12, at 700. This article discusses the widely held
conservationist view view that free trade "blindly fosters the exploitation of natural resources." It similarly discusses GAIT advocates inability to confront the "necessity and
immediacy" of global environmental protection.
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the 1991 Mexican tuna dispute, GATT has declared that such domestic measures are inconsistent with the requirements of international free trade. 88 This ruling holds that such unilateral action
should be disallowed. These two pronouncements continue to coexist, and this strange and irreconcilable co-existence underscores
the legal uncertainty of their relationship.
Perhaps this uncertainty will be resolved by a modification of
domestic legislation. Perhaps, and hopefully, it will be resolved by
a modification of GAIT. Until some resolution or synthesis occurs, however, national environmental legislation and GAIT will
continue as legal ships that pass in the night. One ship has set sail
for the seas of global conservation, the other for the seas of international free trade. Unless efforts are made to place these ships on a
somewhat consistent course, the present uncertainty seems likely to
continue and increase. Because this uncertainty poses dangers to
conservationists and free trade advocates alike, developing a solution should be a priority of both.
88. GAlT Mexican Tuna Panel, supra note 3.
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